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Abstract-with growing .emphasis on reuse, the software development process moves toward 
component-based software‘design. As a result, there is a need for modeling approaches that are 
capable of considering the architecture of the software made out of components. This paper presents 
an overview of the state of the research and practice in the architecture-based approach to quantitative 
assessment of software systems. First, the common requirements of the architecturebased models 
are identified and the classification is proposed. Then, the key models in each class are described 
in detail with a focus on their relation and unification. Finally, a critical analysis of the underlying 
assumptions, limitations, and applicability of these models is provided, which should be helpful in 
determining the directions for future research. @ 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
Keywords-Architecture-based software’reliability, State-based models, Path-based models, Ad- 
ditive models. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A great deal of research effort that addresses the quantification of the software reliability in the 
past has been focused on the black-box models that consider the reliability growth during the 
testing phase [l-3]. These models treat the software as a monolithic whole, considering only its 
interactions with external environment, without an attempt to model internal structure. With 
the growing emphasis on reuse, an increasing number of organizations are developing and using 
software not just as all-inclusive applications, as in the past, but also as component parts of 
larger applications. The existing black-box models are clearly inappropriate to model such a 
large component-based software system. Instead, there is a need for a modeling technique which 
can be used to analyze software components and how they fit together. The goal of the white-box 
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approach is to estimate the system reliability taking into account the information about the ar- 
chitecture of the software made out of components. Given the software architecture, information 
about the components, and their interactions, one can perform calculations in an enlightening 
what-if analysis. What if a certain component were more or less reliable? How would that affect 
system reliability? Since the architecture-based approach allows insight into the sensitivity of 
the total system to each component, it can be used to allocate effort to those components that 
are critical from the reliability or performance point of view. The architecture-based approach 
can be used to calculate system reliability from components information, or to stipulate a system 
reliability and calculate an allocated reliability of components. Additional motivation for the use 
of the architecture-based approach is that it can be used to examine software behavior throughout 
the software life cycle, right from the design phase to implementation and final deployment. 
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the architecture-based approaches to quanti- 
tative assessment of software systems. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The common 
requirements of the architecture-based models along with a classification are discussed in Sec- 
tion 2. The key models are classified and described in detail in Section 3. The assumptions, 
limitations, and applicability of the models are discussed in Section 4. The concluding remarks 
are presented in Section 5. 
2. COMMON REQUIREMENTS AND CLASSIFICATION 
The main purpose of the following discussion is to focus attention on the framework within 
which the existing architecture-based software reliability models have been developed. Thus, 
different approaches for the architecture-based reliability estimation of the software are based on 
the following common steps. 
MODULE IDENTIFICATION. The basic entity in the architecture-based approach is the standard 
software engineering concept of a module. Although there is no universally accepted definition, 
a module is conceived as a logically independent component of the system which performs a 
well-defined function. This implies that a module can be designed, implemented, and tested 
independently. Module definition is a user level task that depends on the factors such as system 
being analyzed, possibility of getting the required data, etc. Module and component will be used 
interchangeably in this paper. 
ARCHITECTURE OF THE SOFTWARE. The software behavior with respect to the manner in which 
the different modules of software interact is defined through the software architecture. Interaction 
occurs only by execution control transfer. In the case of sequential software, at each instant, 
control lies in one and only one of the modules. Software architecture may also include the 
information about the execution time of each module. 
FAILURE BEHAVIOR. In the next step, the failure behavior is defined and associated with the 
software architecture. Failure can happen during an execution period of any module or during the 
control transfer between two modules. The failure behavior of the modules and of the interfaces 
between the modules can be specified in terms of their reliabilities or failure rates (constant or 
time-dependent). 
COMBINING THE ARCHITECTURE WITH THE FAILURE BEHAVIOR. Depending on the method 
used to combine the architecture of the software with the failure behavior, the literature contains 
three essentially different approaches: state-based approach, path-based approach, and additive 
approach. In the following sections, the key models in each of the above classes are described in 
detail, with a focus on their relation and unification. 
3. MODELS RELATION AND UNIFICATION 
In published papers on architecture-based approach to software reliability, a large number of 
variants have been proposed, mostly by ad hoc methods. These have frequently tended to obscure 
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the unifying structural properties common to many such variants. The mathematical treatment 
and the relation of these models becomes evident once their common structure“is exhibited. 
3.1. State-Based Models 
This class of models adapts the control flow graph principles to represent the software archi- 
tecture. Control flow graph reveals the structure, decision points, and branches in program code, 
thus representing the interaction between modules and possible execution paths. State-based 
models assume that the transfer of control between modules has a Markov property which means 
that given the knowledge of the module in control at any given time, the future behavior of the 
system is conditionally independent of the past behavior. The architecture of software has been 
modeled as a discrete time Markov chain (DTMC), continuous time Markov chain (CTMC), or 
semi-Markov process (SMP). These can be further classified into absorbing and irreducible. The 
former represents applications that operate on demand for which software runs that correspond 
to terminating execution can be clearly identified. The latter is well suited for continuously 
operating software applications, such as in real time control systems. 
State-based models estimate software reliability analytically. Depending on the solution meth- 
od they can be classified as either composite or hierarchical [4]. The composite method combines 
the architecture of the software with the failure behavior into a composite model which is then 
solved to predict reliability of the application. The other possibility is to take the hierarchical 
approach, that is, to solve first the architectural model and then to superimpose the failure 
behavior on the solution of the architectural model in order to predict reliability. 
First, consider the models of a terminating software application. The relevant measure for 
these models is the reliability R of the single execution of software application, that is, so-called 
probability of failure per demand 1 - R. 
The Cheung model [5] is one of the earliest models that considers software reliability with 
respect to the modules utilization and their reliabilities. It assumes that a flow graph of a ter- 
minating application has a single entry and a single exit node, and that the transfer of control 
among modules can be described by an absorbing DTMC with a transition probability matrix 
P = [pij], where pij = Pr{program transits from module i to module j}. Modules fail indepen- 
dently and the reliability of the module i is the probability Ri that the module performs its 
function correctly. 
The solution method is composite; two absorbing states C and F are added, representing 
the correct output and failure, respectively, and the transition probability matrix P is modified 
appropriately to P. The original transition probability pij between the modules i and j is 
modified into Ripij, which represents the probability that the module i produces the correct 
result and the control is transferred to module j. From the exit state n, a directed edge to 
state C is created with transition probability R, to represent the correct execution. The failure 
of a module i is considered by creating a directed edge to failure state F with transition probabil- 
ity (1 - Ri). The reliability of the program is the probability of reaching the absorbing state C of 
the DTMC. Let Q be the matrix obtained from P by deleting rows and columns corresponding 
to the absorbing states C and F. Q”(1, ) n re p resents the probability of reaching state n from 1 
through k transitions. From initial state 1 to final state n, the number of transitions k may vary 
from 0 to infinity. It is not difficult to show that S = I+Q+Q2+Q3+. . . = C;L”=c Qk = (I--Q)-‘, 
so it follows that the overall system reliability can be computed as 
R = S(l,n)R,. 
The Cheung model is used in [6] to estimate the reliability of various software architectures 
such as batch-sequential/pipeline, call-and-return, parallel/pipe-filters, and fault tolerance. This 
model is also integrated in the cleanroom reliability manager [7], whose aim is planning and 
certification of component-based software system reliability. 
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The model proposed by Kubat [S] includes the information about the execution time of each 
module, thus resulting in an SMP as a model of software architecture. This model considers a 
terminating software application composed of n modules designed for K different tasks. Each 
task may require several modules, and the same module can be used for different tasks. Transition 
between modules follow a DTMC such that with probability qi(lc), task k will first call module i 
and with probability pij (k), task k will call module j after executing in module i. The sojourn 
time during a visit in module i by task k has the pdf gi(k, t). When module i is executed, failures 
occur with constant failure intensity Xi. 
The solution method taken in this work is hierarchical. The reliability of module i is estimated 
as the probability that no failure occurs during the execution of task k while in module i 
Ri(k) = 
r 
c+gi(k, t) dt. 
0 
During a single execution of the software application, each module i is executed a random num- 
ber of times, denoted by N,(k). Thus, Ri(k)Nt(“) can be considered as the equivalent reli- 
ability of module i that takes into account its utilization and the system reliability becomes 
n;=“=, Ri(k)Ni(k). B ase d on Taylor’s series expansion it is shown that the first-order approxima- 
tion of ,?!?[n~=r Ri(k)Ni(“)] can be used for the system reliability when running for task k 
R(k) M fj Ri(k)K(k), 
i=l 
where Vi(k) = E[Ni (k)] is the expected number of times component i is executed by task k during 
a single execution of a software. Vi(k) can be obtained from the embedded DTMC of the SMP 
that describes the software architecture by solving the following system of linear equations: 
K(k) = qi(k) + 2 %(k) pji(k). 
j=l 
The system failure rate is calculated as X, = cf=‘=, rk[l - R(k)] where rk is the arrival rate of 
task k. 
The hierarchical model proposed by Gokhale et al. [9] differs in the approach taken to estimate 
the component reliabilities; it considers time-dependent failure rates and the utilization of the 
components through the cumulative expected time spent in the component per execution. Again, 
software architecture is described by an absorbing DTMC. Transition probabilities pij between 
modules are determined using the trace data produced during the testing by the coverage analysis 
tool called ATAC [lo]. The expected time spent in a module i per visit ti is computed as a product 
of the expected execution time of each block and the number of blocks in the module. The total 
expected time spent in the module per execution of the application is given by Viti, where the 
expected number of visits to module i, denoted by F$, is computed as in [8]. 
The failure behavior of each component is described by the enhanced nonhomogeneous Pois- 
son process model using a time-dependent failure intensity xi(t) determined by block coverage 
measurements during the testing of the application. The reliability of a component i, given time- 
dependent failure intensity xi(t) and the total expected time Vi& spent in the component per 
execution of the application, is given by 
~~ = ,&?’ k(t) dt, 
while the reliability of the overall application becomes 
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Above software reliability models assume that components fail independently and that a com- 
ponent failure will ultimately lead to a system failure. In hardware system reliability it is generally 
considered that all components are continuously active which corresponds to the usual equation 
for the reliability of a series system R = nr=, Ri. ,The key question in software reliability is 
how to account for component’s utilization, that is, for the stress imposed on each component 
during execution. In the case of the hierarchical models [8,9] the average number of times each 
component is executed Vi is taken as a measure of component’s utilization. 
Next, consider the models of continuously running applications. The relevant measures for 
these models are the exact or approximate distributions of the number of failures N(t) in time 
interval (0, t], waiting time to first failure, and equivalent failure intensity. 
The Littlewood model [ll] is the earliest model that considers software architecture. It assumes 
that the internal structure of the continuously running software can be characterized by an 
irreducible CTMC with transition rate matrix Q = [qij]. F ai ures 1 occur in each component 
according to a Poisson process with rate Xi. In addition to the failure processes within the 
components, this model considers interface failures; when component i calls component j failure 
occurs with probability uij. 
The objective of the model is to analyze the overall failure process. Therefore, the moment 
generating function of the number of failures N(t) in (0, t] is derived from the composite model 
and it is concluded that the analytically tractable results cannot be obtained. However, the 
asymptotic analysis of the model leads to a Poisson process with parameter 
As = c Ti xi + c qijuij , 
i [ 1 j#i 
where 7r = [nil is the equilibrium vector of the irreducible CTMC, i.e., 7rQ = 0. The term in 
the parentheses Ai = Xi + Cjzi qijvij can be interpreted as a failure rate of component i that 
includes the internal component failure rate Xi and the failure rate due to the failures that occur 
during the interactions with other components. Thus, qijvij gives the interface failure rates 
characterizing the failures that occur during interaction with component j. Summing over j, 
therefore, gives the total interface failure rate from state i. Since the steady state probability pi 
represents the average proportion of time spent in state i in the absence of failure, the term 
7~iAi can be considered as the equivalent failure rate of component i that takes into account the 
component utilization. 
The Laprie model [12] is the special case of [ll] which considers only components failures. The 
software system made up of n components is described by a CTMC. The parameters are the 
mean execution time of a component i given by l/pi and the probability pij that component j is 
executed after component i given that no failure occurred during the execution of component i. 
It is assumed that each component fails with constant failure rate &. 
The model of the system is an n + 1 state CTMC where the system is up in the states i, 
0 5 i < n and the (n + l)th state being the down state reached after a failure occurrence. The 
associated generator matrix between the up states B = [bij] is defined by bii = -(pi + Xi) and 
bij = pijpi, for i # j. It can be seen as the sum of two generator matrices: B’ that governs the 
execution process, with diagonal entries equal to -pi and off-diagonal entries to p~pi, and B” 
that governs the failure process, with diagonal entries equal to -Xi and off-diagonal entries to 
zero. The assumption that the failure rates are much smaller than the execution rates ai < pi 
leads to the asymptotic behavior relative to the execution process which enables us to adopt the 
hierarchical solution method. As a consequence, the system failure rate tends to 
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where the steady state probability vector 7r = [7ri] is the solution of TB’ = 0. Although obtained 
in a different way, this result agrees with the one obtained in [ll] for the special case of no 
interface -failures vij = 0. 
The above asymptotic results deserve a few comments. First, the asymptotic Poisson process 
can be seen as a superposition of Poisson processes with parameters TiRi, which is closely related 
to the approach taken in the additive models presented in Section 3.3. Further, consider the 
probability that there will be no failure up to time t, that is, the system reliability 
R(t) = ,-As t = e-c:zl n,lk t = fi e-A” ?r,t. 
i=l 
7ri represents the proportion of time spent in state i in the absence of failure; thus, nit represents 
the cumulative execution time spent in a component i up to time t. For hardware systems, it is 
considered that all components are continuously active which corresponds to making all the ris 
equal to 1 [13]. From the reliability point of view, this leads to the usual equation for a series 
system with a number of subsystems with exponentially distributed times to failure. 
An extension of the Littlewood model [ll] that considers the way failures affect the execution 
and deals with the delays in recovering an operational state was proposed by Ledoux [14]. As in 
[ll], the architecture of a software composed of a set of components C is modeled by an irreducible 
CTMC with transition rates qij. However, this model considers two types of failures: primary 
failure and secondary failure. The primary failure leads to an execution break; the execution is 
restarted after some delay. A secondary failure, as in [11,12], does not affect the software because 
the execution is assumed to be restarted instantaneously when the failure appears. Thus, for an 
active component, a primary failure occurs with constant rate Xl,, while the secondary failures are 
described as Poisson process with rate Xy. When control is transferred between two components 
i and j then a primary (secondary) interface failure occurs with probability Y$ (v$). Following 
the occurrence of a primary failure a recovery state is occupied, and the delay of the execution 
break is a random variable with a phase type distribution. Denoting by R the set of recovery 
states, the state space becomes C U 7-Z. Thus, the CTMC that defines the architecture is replaced 
by a CTMC that models alternation of operational-recovery periods. 
The solution of this composite model is based on the matrix-analytical approach pioneered by 
Neuts [15] which enables many relevant quantities connected with the failure point process to be 
derived in forms which are computationally tractable. These include the distribution function of 
the number of failures N(t) in time interval (0, t], waiting time to the first failure, i.e., reliability 
R(t) = Pr{T > t} = Pr{N(t) = 0}, ex ec e number of failures E[N(t)] in (O,t], and failure p t d 
intensity function h(t). 
Basically, the models that describe software architecture with CTMC are the special cases of 
the versatile Markov point process introduced by Neuts in [15] which was shown to be equivalent 
to the batch Markovian arrival process [lS]. Since this is a rich class of point processes for which 
many relevant probability distributions, moment, and correlation formulas can be obtained in 
forms which are computationally tractable, they have been used extensively to model arrival 
processes in queuing theory. 
The construction of the versatile Markov point process is as follows. Consider an n + 1 state 
CTMC with n transient states and one absorbing state. The infinitesimal generator Q’ obtained 
after deletion of the absorbing state is irreducible and describes the CTMC obtained by resetting 
the original CTMC instantaneously using the same initial probabilities, whenever an absorption 
into state n + 1 occurs. The times of absorption (and resetting) form a renewal process with the 
underlying phase-type distribution. 
The point process is constructed by starting with this phase-type renewal process as a substra- 
tum. Three types of arrival epochs which are related to the evolution of the phase-type renewal 
process are considered. There are Poisson arrivals with arbitrary batch size distributions during 
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sojourns in the states of the CTMC governing the renewal process. The arrival rates of the 
Poisson process and the batch size distributions may depend on the state of the CTMC. The 
underlying CTMC can change states either with or without a corresponding renewal. Each time 
the process changes states there is a batch arrival (the batch size may be 0) where the batch 
size can depend on the states before and after the change, as well as whether or not a renewal 
occurred. 
Let N(t) and X(t), t 2 0 denote, respectively, the number of arrivals in (0, t] and the state of 
the irreducible CTMC defined by Q* at time t. The process {N(t),X(t), t 2 0) is a CTMC with 
state space {k 1 0) x (1,. . . , n}. The close relation of the BMAP with the finite CTMC results 
in the matrix-analytic approach that substantially reduces the computational complexity of the 
algorithmic solution. 
It is obvious that [11,12,14] are the special cases of the BMAP. Thus, in [11,14] only the 
arrivals with batch size 1 are considered which leads to the special case of the BMAP, the so- 
called Markovian arrival process (MAP) [16]. Th e model presented in [12] that considers only the 
Poisson arrivals during sojourn times in the states of the Markov process is a doubly stochastic 
Poisson process known as a Markov modulated Poisson process (MMPP) [16]. 
It is well known that interarrival times of BMAP are phase-type, and that a phase-type distri- 
bution with an irreducible matrix is asymptotically exponential with the eigenvaly of maximal 
real part Xs of matrix as parameter. The scalar XS, known as the fundamental arrival rate 
for the point process [16], can be interpreted as the asymptotic failure rate of the system when 
t --+ co. In other words, when t -+ 00 the failure intensity function h(t) becomes the constant 
value h(oo) = Xs. Using this approach in [14] the Poisson approximation is compared with the 
transient solution for the point process of the composite model. If only secondary failures sre 
considered, the asymptotic failure rate reduces to the one obtained in [ll], i.e., [12] which is the 
parameter of the Poisson process that approximates the distribution for the number of failures 
N(t) in (O,t]. 
Let us now consider the Littlewood model [17], one of the earliest and yet a fairly general 
architecture-based software reliability model. It assumes that the software architecture of a 
continuously running application can be described by an irreducible SMP, thus generalizing the 
previous work [ 111. The transfer of control between modules is described by the probabilities pij, 
while the time spent in each module has a general distribution FQ (t) which depends upon i and j, 
with finite mean rnij. When module i is executed, failures occur according to a Poisson process 
with parameter Xi. The transfer of control between modules (i.e., interfaces) are themselves 
subject to failure with probability q. 
The interest of this composite model is focused on the total number of failures N(t) in time 
interval (0, t] which is the sum of the failures in different modules during their sojourn times, 
together with the interface failures. It is possible to obtain the complete description of this 
failure point process, but since the exact result is very complex, it is unlikely to be of practical 
use. However, under the assumption that many exchanges of control will take place between 
successive program failures, the failure point process is asymptotically the Poisson process, as 
stated in [17]. The failure rate of this Poisson process is given by 
x,y = CaiXi + CbijVij, 
i i,j 
where 
ai = 7 T~‘~p~j?TQj 
j 
represents the proportion of time spent in module i, and 
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is the frequency of transfer of control between i and j. These terms depend only on parameters 
that characterize software architecture: transition probabilities pij, the mean execution times rnij, 
and the steady state probabilities of the embedded Markov chain ni. Thus, terms ai and bij can 
be considered as the measures of components and interfaces utilization. Taking the hierarchical 
approach, they can be obtained as a solution of the model of software architecture. Namely, 
from the limiting behavior of SMP [18] it follows that the proportion of time that irreducible 
SMP {Z(t), t > 0) spends in state i is given by 
ai = hl{2(t) = i ( Z(0) = j} = 
E[amount of time in state i during one cycle] 
E[time of one cycle] 
The sojourn time in state i is given by Hi(t) = Cj pij Fij (t). It follows that the mean time 
spent in i per transition becomes rni = & pijmij. Since 7ri equals the long run proportion of 
transitions which are into state i, the expected amount of time in i during one cycle is given 
by rimi. Summing over i gives the expected time of one cycle xi rimi and ai becomes ai = 
rimi/ xi rimi. Similarly, the limiting number of i to j transfers of control per unit time is given 
by bij = Tipij / xi rimi. 
3.2. Path-Based Models 
Similar to state-based models, path-based models consider the software architecture explicitly 
and assume that components fail independently. However, the method of combining software 
architecture with components and interfaces failure behavior differs from the state-based models. 
Path-based models consider a sequence of components executed along each path and compute 
the path reliability by multiplying their reliabilities. Then, the system reliability is estimated 
by averaging path reliabilities over all paths. Thus, these models account for each component 
utilization along each path, as well as among different paths. 
One of the earliest models that considers reliability of modular programs, introducing the path- 
baaed approach, was proposed by Shooman [19]. This model assumes that software execution can 
take m different paths. The frequency with which path i is run, denoted by fi, and the failure 
probability of the path i on each run, denoted by qi, are assumed to be known. The total number 
of failures nf in N test runs is given by 
n.f = 2 Nh, 
i=l 
where Nfi is the total number of traversals of path i. The failure probability of a software system 
on any test run is computed as 
The path-based model proposed by Krishnamurthy and Mathur [20] takes an experimental 
approach to obtain the path reliability estimates. Specifically, a sequence of components along 
different paths is observed using the component traces collected during the testing or simulation 
of the program behavior. The component trace of a program P for a given test case tc, denoted 
by M(P, tc), is the sequence of components m executed when P is executed against tc. A 
sequence of components along a path traversed for test case tc are considered as a series system, 
and assuming that individual components fail independently of each other it follows that the 
path reliability is J&c = n Rm Vma4(P,tc) 
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The reliability estimate of a program with respect to a test set TS is obtained by averaging path 
reliabilities 
C Rtc 
R = ““‘i;;, . 
An interesting case occurs when most paths executed have components within loops and these 
loops are traversed a sufficiently large number of times. If intracomponent dependency is ignored, 
the individual path reliabilities are likely to become low resulting in system reliability estimate 
much below its true reliability. In this work, the intracomponent dependency is modeled by 
“collapsing” multiple occurrences of a component on the execution path into k occurrences, 
where k > 0 is referred to as the degree of independence. At this point, it is not clear how one 
should determine a suitable value of k. 
An alternative way to resolve the issue of intracomponent dependency is proposed in [21]. The 
solution of dependency characterization of a component that is invoked inside a loop n times 
with a fixed execution time spent in the component per visit relies on the time-dependent failure 
intensity of a component. However, if the constant failure intensity is assumed, the solution 
reduces to the multiple independent executions of the component. 
The Yacoub, Cukic, and Ammar model [22] takes an algorithmic approach to estimate path 
reliabilities. The proposed reliability analysis technique is specific for component-based soft- 
ware whose analysis is strictly based on execution scenarios. A scenario is a set of component 
interactions triggered by specific input stimulus, and it is related to the concept of operations 
and run-types used in operational profiles [23]. Using scenarios, a probabilistic model named 
component dependency graph (CDG) is constructed. A node ni of CDG models a component 
execution with an average execution time ti. The transition probability pij is associated with 
each directed edge e that models the transition from node ni to nj. CDG has two additional 
nodes, s-start node and t-termination node. The failure process considers component reliabili- 
ties Ri and transition reliabilities (1 - vij) associated with a node ni and with a transition from 
node ni to nj, respectively. Based on CDG a tree-traversal algorithm is presented to estimate 
the reliability of the application as a function of reliabilities of its components and interfaces. 
The algorithm expands all branches of the CDG starting from the start node. The breadth ex- 
pansions of the tree represent logical “OR” paths and are hence translated as the summation 
of reliabilities weighted by the transition probability along each path. The depth of each path 
represents the sequential execution of components, the logical “AND”, and is hence, translated 
to multiplication of reliabilities. 
3.3. Additive Models 
This class of models does not consider explicitly the architecture of the software. Rather, they 
are focused on estimating the overall application reliability using the component’s failure data. 
These models consider the software testing phase and assume that each component reliability 
can be modeled by the nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP). It is well known that if the 
component failure processes are modeled by a NHPP, then system failure process is also NHPP 
with the cumulative number of failures and failure intensity function that are the sums of the 
corresponding functions for each component. 
The Xie and Wohlin model [24] considers a software system composed of n components which 
may be developed in parallel and tested independently. If the component reliabilities are modeled 
by NHPP with failure intensity x,(t), then the system failure intensity is 
As(t) = xl(t) + X2(t) + . . * + &L(t), 
and the expected cumulative number of system failures by time t, known as mean value function, 
is given by 
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When this additive model is used, the most immediate problem is that the starting time may not 
be the same for all components; that is, some components may be introduced into the system 
later in the testing process. In that case, the time of the corresponding mean value function 
and failure intensity have to be adjusted appropriately to consider different starting points for 
different components. 
Taking a somewhat similar approach, Everett [25] considers the software made out of compo- 
nents, and addresses the problem of estimating individual component’s reliability. Reliability of 
each component is analyzed using the extended execution time (EET) model whose parameters 
can be determined from properties of the software and from the information on how test cases and 
operational usage stress each component. The combined model for the overall system superim- 
poses component reliabilities. When the underlying EET models for the components are NHPP 
models, the cumulative number of failures and failure intensity functions for the superposition of 
such models is just the sum of the corresponding functions for each component. 
It should be noted that the Everett model considers the utilization of software components, 
that is, the software architecture implicitly. The model used for capturing component’s reliability 
growth includes the information about the relative usage stress imposed on each component as a 
parameter of the model. Also, it is required to keep track of the cumulative execution time spent 
in each component during the testing which is used to compute the cumulative number of failures 
and failure intensity function. In other words, this approach is closely related to the approach for 
estimating components reliabilities presented in [9] that explicitly takes into account the software 
architecture. 
4. MODELS ASSUMPTIONS, 
LIMITATIONS, AND APPLICABILITY 
The benefit of the architecture-based approach is evident in the context of component-based 
software systems. However, it appears to add complexity to the models and to data collection 
as well. Many questions related to this approach are still unanswered, and more research in this 
area is needed, in particular when it comes to the issues indicated below. 
LEVEL OF DECOMPOSITION. There is a tradeoff in defining the components. Too many small 
components could lead to a large state space which may pose difficulties in measurements, pa- 
rameterization, and solution of the model. On the other hand, too few components may cause 
the distinction of how different components contribute to the system failures to be lost. The 
level of decomposition clearly depends on the tradeoff between the number of components, their 
complexity, and the available information about each component. The choices made for the level 
of decomposition in the experimental studies published so far are very diverse. For example, 
in [26] the telephone switching software system is decomposed into four groups according to the 
main functions, in [20] decomposition is based on the standard components of the Unix utility 
grep, in [9] application SHARPE [27] is decomposed into 30 components, each corresponding to 
a single file, while in [22] the decomposition is based on the six reused components. 
ESTIMATION OF INDIVIDUAL COMPONENT RELIABILITIES. Most ofthe papers on architecture- 
based reliability estimation assume that component reliabilities are available, that is, ignore 
the issue of how they can be determined. Assessing the reliability of individual components 
clearly depends on the factors such as whether or not component code is available, how well the 
component has been tested, and whether it is a reused or a new component. 
One might argue that the reliability growth models can be applied to each software component 
exploiting component’s failure data. For example, Kanoun et al. [26] applied the hyperexponential 
model, Gokhale et al. [9] used the enhanced NHPP model, while Everett [25] used the extended 
execution time model. However, due to the scarcity of failure data, it is not always possible to use 
software reliability growth models for estimating the individual component’s reliability. Further 
difficulties are due to the fact that the underling assumptions of software reliability growth models 
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such as random testing performed according to the operational profile and the independence of 
successive testing runs can be seriously violated during the unit testing phase [28]. 
Another class of models estimates component’s reliability from the explicit consideration of 
nonfailed executions, possibly together with failures [7,29-311. Such models can be used to make 
reliability estimations of the software component based on the results of testing performed in 
its validation phase. In this phase, no changes are made to the software, and these models can 
be termed as stable reliability models. The problem which arises with these models is the large 
number of executions necessary for estimating reliability levels which are commensurate with 
reasonable expectations. 
Several other techniques for estimating component’s reliability have been proposed. Krishna- 
murthy et al. [20] used the method of seeding faults. Voas [32] examined a method to determine 
the quality of CO,TS components using black-box component testing and system-level fault in- 
jection. However, a difficulty with fault-based techniques is that they are only as powerful as the 
range of fault classes that they simulate. 
ESTIMATION OF INTERFACE RELIABILITIES. There seems to be little information available about 
interface failures, apart from general agreement that they exist separately from component failures 
which are revealed during the unit testing. In practice, one needs to estimate the reliability of 
each interface. When an interface is a program, any of the methods mentioned above can be 
used to estimate its reliability. However, when an interface consists of items such as global 
variables, parameters, and files, it is not clear how to estimate its reliability. Some explanation 
and analysis about the interfaces between components has been performed by Voas et al. [33]. 
Also, the method for integration testing proposed by Delamaro et al. [34] seems promising for 
estimating interface reliabilities. 
VALIDITY OF MARKOV ASSUMPTION. All state-space models assume that the next component 
to be executed will depend probabilistically on the present component only and is independent 
of the past history; that is, they assume that the embedded Markov chain is a first-order chain. 
However, the hypothesis that the chain is of a given order needs to be tested. If the probability 
to find the system in given state (executing a specified component) does not depend only on 
the last executed component but on a given number of components which were executed before 
the specified state was entered, then the system can be described by a model of higher order. It 
would enable us to consider the situations when the execution time of a component and its failure 
behavior are dependent on the number of components along the path from which the control was 
transferred. However, the size of the state space grows fast with the number of components which 
makes model specification and analysis a difficult and error-prone process, requires considerable 
amount of data, and imposes difficulties in both measurements and parameterization. 
ESTIMATION OF TRANSITION PROBABILITIES. In the architecture-based approach, one must 
model the interaction of all components. In a well-designed system, interaction among compo- 
nents is limited; that is, the transition probability matrix will be sparse. During the design phase, 
before actual development and integration phases, transition probabilities may be obtained by 
analyzing program structure and using known operational profiles. During the integration phase, 
as new data become available, the estimates have to be updated, thereby improving the predic- 
tions. The following two papers demonstrate two different approaches for estimating transition 
probabilities. .In [22], first the estimates of the probabilities of execution of different scenarios 
are obtained based on the operational profile. Then, using the analysis of scenarios the transi- 
tions probabilities are calculated. In [9] the transition probabilities are computed based on the 
execution counts extracted from the ATAC trace files obtained during coverage testing. 
OPERATIONAL PROFILE. Software reliability models assume that random test selection is guided 
according to the user’s operational profile [23]. Test selection aimed at finding faults, increasing 
various structure coverages, or demonstrating different functional requirements are not repre- 
sentative of the user’s operational profile and might lead to a reliability estimate different from 
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one perceived by the user of the system. Further, upgrades to software might invalidate any 
existing estimate of the operational profile because new features can change the ways in which 
the software is used. Therefore, it will be necessary to revise the architecture that describes 
component interaction. Also, care must be taken to ensure that the change of operational profile 
is considered in assessing component’s reliability. 
CONSIDERING FAILURE DEPENDENCIES AMONG COMPONENTS AND INTERFACES. Without ex- 
ception the existing models assume that the failure processes associated across different com- 
ponents are mutually independent. When considered, the interface failures are also assumed to 
be mutually independent and independent of the components failure processes. However, if the 
failure behavior of a component is affected in any way by the previous component being executed, 
or by the interface between them, these assumptions are no longer acceptable. This dependence 
can be referred to as intercomponent dependence [20]. One way to encounter intercomponent 
dependence in the case of state space models would be to consider a Markov chain of higher order 
as discussed above. Intracomponent dependence can arise, for example, when a component is 
invoked more than once in a loop by another component. An attempt to address intracomponent 
dependence was made in [20,21]. 
EXTRACTING SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE. The architecture of an application may not always 
be readily available. In such cases, it has to be extracted from the source code or the object code 
of the application. Techniques and tools for extraction of static architectural information can be 
either parser-based or lexically-based [35], while the system’s dynamic behavior can be captured 
using profilers or test coverage tools. The tools that are currently used at Duke University 
to extract the dynamic view of the software architecture include the GNU profiler gprof [36], 
the coverage testing tool ATAC [37], and the toolkit ATOM [38]. Recently, a workbench for 
architectural extraction, called Dali, that fuses different architectural views was developed [39]. 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS. Since the architecture-based approach allows insight into the contribu- 
tion made by each component to the unreliability of the whole system, it can be used to perform 
sensitivity analysis. Although this advantage is recognized by many researchers [9,20,22], the 
method for computing the sensitivity of system reliability with respect to a given component reli- 
ability is developed only for the model presented in [5]. It is used in [7] for reliability allocation to 
each component which is based on the target reliability for the entire system and the sensitivity 
of the system to the component. 
CONSIDERING MULTIPLE SOFTWARE QUALITY ATTRIBUTES. The architecture-based approach 
for quantitative assessment of software systems is mainly focused on reliability evaluation. How- 
ever, it has a potential for performance evaluation since most of the existing architecture-based 
models consider components’ execution times. Performance as a software quality attribute refers 
to the timeliness aspects of how a software system behaves. A possible measure of software per- 
formance for a terminating application could be the expected execution time of the application 
which can be computed as Ci Viti. The measure of performance for a continuously running appli- 
cation could be the expected time of one cycle. Consider, for example, the Littlewood model [17]. 
If the SMP starts in state j, then one cycle is completed every time the SMP returns to j. The 
expected time of one cycle is given by [18] (l/nj) xi 7rimi = (l/nj) xi 7ri cj porno. 
Depending on the quality attributes of interest different qualitative and quantitative techniques 
can be used to conduct the analysis. Thus, this paper presents an overview from the perspective 
of the software reliability engineering community, while Smith and Williams in [40] describe the 
analysis framework called software performance engineering. These communities are focused 
on different quality attributes in isolation, without considering the impact on other attributes 
and tradeoffs between multiple conflicting attributes. The analysis of multiple software quality 
attributes and their tradeoffs is an important area where much work needs to be done. The first 
step in that direction is the architecture tradeoff analysis method, developed at the Software 
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Engineering Institute [41] which addresses the problem of architecture analysis based on multiple 
quality attributes such as performance, availability, and security. 
CONSIDERING DIFFERENT ARCHITECTURAL STYLES. Today’s software applications are far more 
complex, frequently running on two or more processors, under different operating systems, and 
on geographically distributed machines. As a result, there is a proliferation of research activities 
focused on software architecture. 1 Because architectural decisions are usually made early in the 
life-cycle, they are the hardest to change, and hence, the most critical and far-reaching. If software 
engineering is to mature as an engineering discipline, standardized architectural styles will have 
to be developed, along with the methods for their qualitative and quantitative assessment. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper identifies the common requirements, proposes the classification, and attempts to 
relate and unify the existing architecture-based software reliability models. It also provides a crit- 
ical analysis of the underlying assumptions, limitations, and applicability of these models which 
should be helpful in determining the directions of future research. Our goal was to present the 
state of the research and practice in the architecture-based approach to quantitative assessment 
of software reliability and to point out that the knowledge that already exists in the various 
research communities needs to be drawn on to enhance current software engineering practices. 
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